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ARTICLE
Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps
Cap-and-Trade
STEPHEN SEWALK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Threat of Global Warming
There is a growing demand for domestic climate change
legislation in the United States that will lead to significant
reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG)1 emissions.
A recent
publication by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) stated that fossil fuel consumption accounts for the
majority of anthropogenic GHGs.2 If we fail to make significant
reductions in GHG emissions, we are risking the future of our

* Stephen Sewalk, Ph.D./J.D., is an Assistant Professor for the Burns School
of Real Estate and Construction Management, Daniels College of Business,
University of Denver. The author wishes to thank Ned Vanda and Paul
Chinowsky for reviewing drafts of this article and Emma Tauchman for
providing outstanding research assistance.
1. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1949 U.N.T.S. I-30822
(defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere,
both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”);
see also David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063,
2065 (2003) (explaining that different gases have different effects on global
warming, so emissions are standardized to CO2 equivalents when measuring
their effects on global warming).
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SPECIAL REPORT
ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (SRREN)
SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (2011), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_
events/docs/ipcc33/SRREN_FD_SPM_final.pdf (stating that the contributions of
individual anthropogenic GHGs to total emissions in 2004, reported in AR4,
expressed as CO2-e were: CO2 from fossil fuels at 56.6%, CO2 from deforestation,
decay of biomass etc. at 17.3%, CO2 from other sources at 2.8%, CH4 at 14.3%,
N2O at 7.9%, and F-gases at 1.1%).
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environment. Global climate change threatens to bring on
catastrophic devastation to our entire planet’s resources.3 This
threat has been a major push for climate change legislation in the
United States.4 In order to reduce GHG emissions at the lowest
possible cost, lawmakers need to adopt a climate change policy
with economic incentives.5 To meet the challenge of reducing
GHG emissions, innovation within the energy industry is
necessary to promote development in cleaner production.6 The
cost of such innovation plays a large role in managing this issue.
B. The Need for Change: The Push for Climate Change
Legislation
Two distinct proposals have been made to reduce GHG
emissions: a carbon tax and cap-and-trade. Cap-and-trade has
focused on limiting emissions with the expectations that
technology can actually do so without resulting in prices for
carbon being so high that either economic growth is impacted or
emissions are not reduced.7 The carbon tax proposals on the
other hand claim that a tax on carbon would reduce demand for
carbon intensive items thereby reducing total emissions while

3. See William Collins et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change,
SCI. AM., Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=sciencebehind-climate-change (providing a briefing of the science of climate change).
4. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW
ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1, 21 (2009), available at
http://gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf (stating that “[t]he
Administration is developing a comprehensive energy and climate change plan
to invest in clean energy, end our addiction to oil, address the global climate
crisis, and create new American jobs that cannot be outsourced.”).
5. Barry Anderson et al., Technological Change and the EU ETS: The Case
of Ireland 2 (Ctr. for Res. on Energy & Envtl. Econ. & Policy at Bocconi Univ.,
Working Paper No. 43, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855495.
6. Suzanne Scotchmer, Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation,
11 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2011).
7. See generally Miles Young, Beautifying the Ugly Step-Sister: Designing an
Effective Cap-and-Trade Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2009
BYU L. REV. 1379 (2009); Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a
Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 298
(2008); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008).
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refunding the tax to consumers.8 Neither of these proposals
specifically addresses carbon emissions nor show how emissions
are actually reduced. This paper introduces carbon tax with
reinvestment, whereby all taxes raised by the carbon tax are
reinvested into specific low-to-no carbon energy sources that
result in a systematic reduction in total carbon emissions. The
results are stunning and are shown in the models, resulting in a
significant extended reduction in carbon emissions.
More
importantly, the proactive nature of the tax structure results in
significant new construction, job creation, and eventually a
reduction in total tax due to the rapidly declining emissions. The
tax is structured so that there is no incentive to invest in
production in non-compliant regions, resulting in a worldwide
abatement effort for GHG emissions.
In Part I of this paper, I will review the current opinion
surrounding carbon tax proposals as they appear in the
literature. Part II will provide an overview of the current capand-trade proposals. Part III will introduce a carbon tax with
reinvestment. In Part IV of this article, I will review the leading
proposals arguing that a carbon tax is superior to cap-and-trade.
And finally, for Part V, I will explain why a carbon tax with
reinvestment trumps cap-and-trade.
II. CARBON TAX
A. What is a Carbon Tax?
A carbon tax is a tax that is levied per ton of emissions of
carbon dioxide.9 This form of climate change regulation is
recognized in the literature as being the simplest way to reduce
carbon emissions.10 Carbon taxes act as a means of internalizing
negative externalities.11
Those who emit carbon through
8. See generally Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax is
Better than Cap and Trade 1261 (U. of Colo. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 0918, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489592; Gilbert Metcalf &
David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working
Paper No. 447, 2009).
9. Young, supra note 7, at 1391.
10. Id.; Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8.
11. See Duff, supra note 1, at 2069.
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consumption, production, and distribution create negative
externalities in the form of pollution that affects all of society.
Currently, those polluters are doing so with no repercussions.
Through taxation, the polluters internalize those externalities.
From an economic standpoint, this internalization through
taxation is a justifiable reason to impose a carbon tax.12 From an
environmental standpoint, a carbon tax implements the “polluter
pays principle,” as included in Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration.13 In short, this means that whoever causes the
pollution should have to bear the costs of the harm caused, as
well as the cost of minimizing future harm.14
B. Internalizing the Negative Externalities
Surprisingly, politicians are typically not supporters of a
carbon tax. Carbon taxes force products to reflect their negative
environmental impacts, they encourage technological innovation,
they generate revenue, and they are easy to administer.15
Supporters of a carbon tax also cite the advantages of the tax for
its lack of interference with other regulatory instruments, the
clear message being sent by the government, and the price
stability.16

12. Id.
13. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration Principle 16, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (The Rio Declaration is a
declaration of 27 principles adopted by the UNCED and endorsed by the U.N.
General Assembly. The principles of the Rio Declaration are the result of
compromise between developed and developing nations.).
14. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27 (1989) (noting “the polluter
should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution decided upon by public
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state”).
15. Young, supra note 7 (citing Michael J. Zimmera, Carbon Tax: Ready for
Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL’Y 67 (2008); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595 (2007)).
16. See, e.g., Roberta Mann, To Tax or Not to Tax Carbon - Is That the
Question?, 24 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 44 (2009).
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C. The Importance of a Revenue-Neutral Tax
Current carbon tax proposals call for a revenue-neutral tax
with two favored approaches for revenue returns.17 The first
approach is an equal dividends approach, where the revenues
would be rebated directly to all U.S. residents in equal portions.18
The second approach is a “tax shift” approach. This method takes
each dollar of the tax’s revenue and reduces existing taxes by that
dollar amount. Taxes facing reduction could be federal payroll
taxes or state sales taxes.19 These forms of revenue-neutrality
help to encourage public acceptance of the tax and to prevent the
tax from taking on a regressive form.20 However, the approaches
listed above do not assist in the overarching goal of emission
reductions.
Prior to the creation of the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the European Commission proposed a
region-wide carbon tax.21 The tax was poorly received by the EU
members because they saw the proposal as a threat to their
countries’ autonomy, as taxation had been firmly held to be a
sovereign right for those countries.22 Nonetheless, all twentyseven countries of the EU have some form of energy tax, and the
European
Commission
has
issued
several
directives
recommending energy taxes in addressing climate change.23 The
United States does not have to overcome the issue of state
sovereignty regarding excise taxes.24 However, the United States
is plagued by social disdain of paying taxes. This fact is obviated

17. Pricing Carbon Efficiently and Equitably, CARBON TAX CTR., http://
www.carbontax.org/introduction (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
18. Id. (providing a comparison to Alaska’s North Slope oil revenues).
19. Id.; see also Gilbert E. Metcalf, Paying for Greenhouse Gas Reductions:
What is the Role of Fairness?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 393 (2011) (advocating
the tax-shift approach for revenue neutrality).
20. Metcalf, supra note 19, at 400 (explaining the importance of avoiding a
regressive tax).
21. F. J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 ENVTL. & RES.
ECON. n. 3, 391 (2009).
22. Id. at 393.
23. Id. (stating that the United States, comprised of fifty states within one
nation, does not have the same taxation issues with regards to a threat of state
autonomy).
24. See generally I.R.C §§ 861, 4053(9) (2009).
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in political elections.
As historian Robin Einhorn wrote,
“Americans hate everything about taxation with a passion. . . .
No campaign promise works better than the promise to cut
taxes.”25 Nevertheless, taxation is considered a necessary burden
by the public in order to obtain revenues to finance public
necessities.26 In this case, the public necessity takes the form of
reducing harmful emissions in order to preserve the health of our
nation and our environment. Additionally, the transparency of a
carbon tax will assist in obtaining public support during
implementation.27 This is contrary to a similar cap-and-trade
bill. A carbon tax meets the criteria of a climate change policy
that can achieve ecological sustainability and political feasibility,
despite the initial hesitation of the public.28
In the existing literature, there are two recurring
shortcomings regarding carbon taxes. The first is the regressive
nature of the tax, and the second is the lack of guarantee as to
the true reduction of carbon emissions. The first of these issues
can be avoided by the methods of revenue-neutrality as discussed
above. The second issue is more pressing. Current carbon tax
proposals work off of the hope that taxation will discourage
practices that emit carbon and push companies to invest in
newer, cleaner technologies.29 New legislation must rely on
nothing but fact when it comes to the effectiveness of a policy’s
emission reductions.
For this reason, previous carbon tax
proposals will not be sufficient.

25. Jonathan Mann, Why Americans Hate Paying Taxes, CNN, Dec. 17, 2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-17/us/jonathan.mann.us.taxes_1_tax-cutsboston-tea-party-americans?_s=PM.
26. Duff, supra note 1, at 2068.
27. Mann, supra note 16.
28. Samantha McCann & Richard P. Young, Path Dependence and Cap and
Trade: Why We Need a Green Tax (W. Political Sci. Ass’n, Annual Meeting
Paper, 2011).
29. See generally Florian Habermacher & Gebhard Kirchgässner, Climate
Effects of Carbon Taxes, Taking into Account Possible Other Future Climate
Measures 27 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 340, Cat. 10: Energy and Climate
Economics, 2011).
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III. CAP-AND-TRADE
A. What is a Carbon Tax?
In a cap-and-trade program, a government agency
establishes a limit, or cap, on regulated polluters’ carbon
emissions and then allocates set numbers of emission allowances
among them. Trading of these allowances determines the value
of allowances and creates a market between polluters.30 If
targeted polluters surpass this cap, they must purchase reduction
credits from other regulated polluters who go below their
assigned caps.31 A cap-and-trade program has been the leading
proposal for climate change legislation in the United States.32
The most recent cap-and-trade proposal was the American Clean
Energy and Security Act, also known as the Waxman-Markey
bill.33 This bill was designed to establish an emissions trading
plan in the United States that would reduce carbon emissions
and create clean energy jobs.34 The Waxman-Markey bill was
approved by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, but
died in the Senate in that same year.35 To date, the U.S.
Congress has not passed any federal legislation on climate
change.36 However, political figures favor the idea of cap-andtrade because the cap-and-trade system is not called a “tax,” and
the government can decide where to allocate emission

30. Gilbert E. Metcalf et al., Analysis of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 13980, 2008).
31. David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon (Syracuse Univ. Coll. of Law,
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463016.
32. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming
than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009).
33. H.R.2454 - The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, OPEN
CONG., http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/actions_votes (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013).
34. See Robert Stavins, The Wonderful Politics of Cap-and-Trade: A Closer
Look at Waxman-Markey, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS (May 27, 2009),
http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/2009/05/27/the-wonderful-politics-of-cap-andtrade-a-closer-look-at-waxman-markey/.
35. H.R.2454, supra note 33.
36. Id.
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allowances.37
Environmentalists favor this system for the
absolute quantity restrictions on carbon emissions.38 The moneymaking potential of a market-based program leads to support
from many industry groups.39 Groups supporting this type of
program rely on the following assumptions of the cap-and-trade
system: (1) carbon emissions below a certain level (that level
which is set by the assigned cap) do not cause undue harm to the
environment, and (2) a market in pollution allowances (the trade
aspect) is “the most cost-effective means of reducing pollution to
the predetermined level. . . .”40
A cap-and-trade system gives the benefit of increasing the
limits on carbon dioxide emissions, allowing for flexibility in the
market.41 This flexibility allows for an ease of transition for
affected facilities. This appeal of the cap-and-trade system
obscures the fact that a cap-and-trade system is not the best
option to combat climate change. First of all, even if Congress
were to pass cap-and-trade legislation tomorrow, it will be years
before a cap-and-trade system would be put into effect.42 The
integral delays of our nation’s rulemaking process would stall the
date at which the cap-and-trade could become operational.
Second, deciding on an appropriate baseline for emission
reduction targets, how allowances are distributed, and the allimportant decision regarding the use of offsets would further
challenge an early start date. Third, there is no certainty of the
price required to achieve the promised reduction levels set forth
by the reduction cap.43 The carbon market is one of volatile price
37. See Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome
Politics and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118,
101120 (2009).
38. Id.
39. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 5.
40. Mann, supra note 37, at 10120.
41. See generally Young, supra note 7.
42. See Zhong Xiang Zhang, The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO
Scrutiny and China’s Response 10 (Int’l Econ. & Econ. Policy, Working Paper,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517488 (describing the four years
of preparation required before implementing the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading
Program and the two years to establish the EU-ETS).
43. See Jon Strand, Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete
Abatement: Carbon Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade 2-3 (The World Bank, Dev.
Research Grp., Env’t & Energy Team, Working Paper No. 5675, 2011).
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shifts. If the price of carbon is too high, there will be pressure to
relax the cap.44 Too much relaxation in this cap abolishes the
carbon market.
a. Why is Cap-and-Trade so Popular?
An upstream, economy-wide cap-and-trade system has been
suggested as the best approach for short-to-medium term climate
change regulation in the United States.45 This proposal creates a
system that includes a course of caps that begin modestly and
gradually lower over time.46 It is suggested that this type of capand-trade will create a long-run price signal that will encourage
investment.47 Included in this proposal are certain mechanisms
to protect against cost uncertainty, as well as linkages with the
climate policies of other countries.48 It is argued that this
proposed cap-and-trade system will provide the option to alleviate
economic impacts through the distribution of emission
allowances, and this will lead to public consent to reduce
emissions.49 This proposal of a cap-and-trade system that
maximizes emission reductions and minimizes public cost is an
effective approach. Cap-and-trade can do a very good job of
reducing carbon emissions when we are certain of the demand for
emissions, when we regulate those emissions flawlessly, and
when all emission allowances are auctioned off.50 However, if
there exists uncertainty in the demand for producing emissions,
and if there are difficulties in monitoring and regulating emission
permits, the cap-and-trade proposal will lose its viability.51 If
politics interferes in the dispersal of permits, this viability will be
further weakened.52

44. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 6.
45. Stavins, supra note 7, at 6.
46. See id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Philip I. Levy, The Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade Royal Rumble, FOREIGN
POL’Y, May 13, 2009, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/13/the_
carbon_taxcap_and_trade_royal_rumble.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id.
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This described cap-and-trade system identifies the
importance of low carbon technologies for cost management in
emission reductions.53
The price signals provided by caps
extending decades into the future will incentivize the
development and use of these technologies.54 It is this assumed
reaction that will lower future costs of achieving those reductions
set by the decreasing cap. Due to the uncertainties surrounding
this idea, additional policies are needed to provide further
government funding and/or increased incentives for private
funding in research and development.55 These policies include
multi-year compliance periods, banking and borrowing
provisions, a cost containment mechanism to prevent extreme
pricing, and the availability of offsets for carbon capture and
sequestration.56 In sum, this type of cap-and-trade system
introduces significant complexity.
It is very important to consider cost when setting emission
standards under a cap-and-trade system.57
Traditional
environmental law typically does not consider cost when setting
environmental standards.58 This is demonstrated by the national
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. Like the
goal of GHG emission reductions, the standards set by the Clean
Air Act are established to protect human health.59 For this
reason, the Supreme Court has held that the United States’
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cannot consider cost
when setting these standards.60 The clash of cost consideration
and environmental standards does not fit in well with the
aforementioned cap-and-trade proposals.61 For cap-and-trade to
53. Stavins, supra note 7, at 5.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 9.
57. See Driesen, supra note 31, at 19; see generally Richard S.J. Tol, The
Polluter Pays Principle and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: An
Application of Fund (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota di Lavoro, Working
Paper No. 88.2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=907456.
58. Driesen, supra note 31, at 20.
59. Id.
60. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding
that section 109(b) bars consideration of cost in setting national ambient air
quality standards).
61. Stavins, supra note 7, at 46.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8

10

590

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

work, both costs and environmental standards must maintain a
stabilized state.
Because of cap-and-trade’s significant
complexity, this is an unlikely feat.
Cap-and-trade supporters argue that cap-and-trade is the
only proposal with a political chance.62 It is true that people do
not want to have to pay to pollute, but how does cap-and-trade
circumvent this issue? In truth, this factor is only temporarily
overcome by the absence of the word “tax.” The signal sent by a
carbon tax is one that is very clear: pollution results in a negative
externality imposed on others, so polluters should be forced to
internalize the cost of their pollution by paying a tax.63 Even if
people are willing to pay the carbon tax, the intended message is
clear.
Despite common belief, cap-and-trade may send a very
ambiguous message in terms of emission reductions.64 The goal
is to reduce GHG emissions, but this goal is achieved either by
requiring polluters to purchase the right to pollute or, in the case
of free allowance distribution, use permits to pollute for free.65
Cap-and-trade programs that auction off all emission allowances
give the same message of internalizing the externalities.66
However, where allowances are distributed for free, the message
is more ambiguous. In a sense, the government is giving
permission to pollute in the form of emission allowances. Finally,
the wording surrounding both cap-and-trade and carbon tax
emission requirements sends different signals. Arguably, the
biggest barrier of implementing a carbon tax is the societal
apprehension toward paying taxes.67 In the case of sending a
signal to polluters, the word “tax” sends a stronger, more severe

62. Levy, supra note 50, at 44.
63. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44.
64. See Driesen, supra note 31 (addressing the problematic widespread
acceptance of cap-and-trade programs resulting in an automatic reduction in
carbon emissions).
65. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 44-45; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and
Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006); Janet E. Milne,
Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 417, 419 (2011) (listing failed attempts at environmental taxes on
environmentally damaging activities).
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signal to polluters than phrases like “the purchase price for a
right to pollute.”68 Phrases like this are designed by legislators to
remove the stigma surrounding pollution.69
However,
governmental condemnation of pollution sends the message that
pollution is bad and that methods of development and production
that reduce carbon emissions should be favored.70 Alternatively,
it can be argued that the lack of a stigma gives the opposite
signal: the purchase price for a “right to pollute” puts less
demand on society’s need to reduce emissions.71 Overall, the
signal sent out to polluters is not nearly as important as the
reductions in carbon emissions. If cap-and-trade is going to
successfully reduce emissions, it will have to raise the cost of
emissions.72 Support may be obtained by hiding this fact, but
this deceptive approach is not ideal for a long-term environmental
policy.73
b. Cap-and-Trade and the Economy
Furthermore, in times of recession and slow economic
growth, like our nation is currently experiencing, a cap-and-trade
system will increase the burden on our economy. Cap-and-trade
is designed to increase the cost of energy.74 During this economic
crisis, an energy policy that does not encourage a reduction in
production costs is the wrong choice. A cap on emissions requires
companies to increase costs to consumers in order to compensate
for the costs of purchasing emissions allowances.75
These
additional costs will lead to a decrease in energy demand that
occurs simultaneously with an increase in the cost of energy, so
68. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 44.
69. Nash, supra note 67, at 325-26.
70. See id. at 326.
71. Id.
72. Levy, supra note 50, at 2.
73. Nash, supra note 67 (providing a deeper look into the public tendencies
resulting from “framing effects” of climate change legislation).
74. See generally William Yeatman, Cap and Trade’s Economic Impact,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/
cap-trades-economic-impact/p18738 (offering a take on cap-and-trade’s impact
on the current economy from the point of view of an Energy Policy Analyst with
Competitive Enterprise Institute).
75. Id.
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companies will end up cutting jobs.76 Whether directly affected
by job losses or the increased prices on energy and energy
intensive goods and services, everyone will feel the impact of capand-trade.
Even in a booming economy, cap-and-trade is not beneficial.
An emissions cap will force companies to spend significant
resources to adopt cleaner means of production. As mentioned,
these adaptation costs will be placed onto consumers, increasing
the price on all goods and services requiring energy as an input. 77
This price increase will make American goods less competitive in
the world market.78 This will incentivize companies to produce
overseas in a country with no cap-and-trade.79 As such, cap-andtrade has the capability to impair even a flourishing economy. In
addition, there is no certainty that implementing cap-and-trade
will result in real reductions of GHG emissions, particularly ones
that the economy can afford.
B. European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme
In its initial phase, the European Union’s Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) covered a very limited number of markets.80
Steelmakers were part of the scheme, whereas aluminum
smelters were not, so they faced no reductions.81
The
Commission is working to eliminate these disparities, but while
they may continue to make the carbon market more equal,
companies will continue to put the pressure on politicians to be
“more equal than others.”82 Additionally, those companies that
operate domestically, like power utilities, are able to pass on the
cost of allowances to their consumers. Those companies that
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Sergey V. Mityakov, Cap and Trade’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/cap-tradeseconomic-impact/p18738 (explaining the hardships of cap-and-trade in a
booming economy).
79. Id.
80. See generally Stephen Gardner, The Winners and Losers of EU Carbon
Trading, CLIMATE CHANGE CORP., Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.climatechangecorp.
com/content.asp?ContentID=5654.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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work out of an international market do not have this convenience
and experience greater difficulties in funding adaptation.83 In
fact, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has determined that
the power industry has achieved oversight profits from their
participation in the scheme.84 Their allotted allowances paired
with their ability to pass on their carbon cost have allowed the
power sector to ride out the carbon market with little
inconvenience while other sectors pay a heavy toll.
a. EU-ETS: Setting a Precedent?
The EU-ETS faced many problems during its first trading
period. To begin, the Commission reviewed each nation’s initial
National Action Plan (NAP),85 in which each country described its
proposed reduction levels and the number of freely distributed
allowances it required.86 Unfortunately, the Commission had
neither the time nor the technology to adequately assess the
information provided in each NAP. Despite the fact that the
Commission was forced to rely on the accuracy of each nation’s
assumptions leading to the proposed emission caps, the European
Commission rejected more than half of those countries’ NAPs in
order to avoid allocations that exceeded overall need.87 Though
the task of the Commission was a formidable one, reduction
targets were finally set. However, the EU-ETS soon learned that
set emission targets did not mean a guaranteed market or
guaranteed emissions.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Claudia Kettner et al., Stringency and Distribution in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme: The First Evidence, 8 CLIMATE POL’Y 41 (2008)
(explaining that the Commission guidelines for preparing the NAPs were
created with the expectation that each EU member state had a similar
interpretation of the EU guidelines. It was expected that each plan would place
caps of similar rigidity, and therefore avoid any evident disparities between
countries. As resulted in the data, variations of allowances and emissions were
widespread.).
86. Joelle de Sepibus, Scarcity and Allocation of Allowances in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme - A Legal Analysis 3 (NCCR Trade, Working Paper
No. 2007/32, 10, 2007).
87. Id. at 10.
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The verified data for the EU-ETS was released in April of
2006.88 According to this data, 2,029 million tons of CO2 were
allocated, but only 1,932 million tons were emitted, and only six
of the twenty-four countries allocated less allowances than
needed.89 After this data was released, the price of allowances
fell drastically from almost thirty euros at the time of the release
down to twelve euros in May of that year, before continuing its
decline to under one euro in 2007.90 In all, this first trading
period was marked as a failure and a carbon market collapse.
Overall, the allocation methods did not stray much from
those of the first trading period, including the free allocation of
emission allowances.
Due to this, there had been little
improvement.
The Commission tried to be stricter in its
examination of the second period NAPs, but with lacking
resources to evaluate reduction methodologies, the assessments
proved to be inconsistent and limited.91 However, in this current
trading period, the Commission has continued its attempts to
resolve those inconsistencies that plague the system. Recent
revisions under the EU-ETS attempt to centralize the Directive to
create a more harmonious system. This includes the setting of
caps, the allocation of rules, and the monitoring, reporting, and
verification of requirements.92 While it has risen from the
monumental collapse of the first trading period, after six years,
the EU-ETS continues to battle the complications of cap-andtrade’s significant complexities.
b. Why the EU-ETS Will Not Work in the U.S. and
What We Are Doing Instead
To date, the EU houses the largest cap-and-trade system
aimed at reducing carbon emissions.93 It is suggested that an

88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. (citing Kettner et al., supra note 85).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 14-15.
92. Sanja Bogojevic, The EU ETS Directive Revised: Yet Another Stepping
Stone, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 280 (2009).
93. Gbenga Ibikunle & Andros Gregoriou, International Emissions Trading:
A Survey of Phases of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 5 (Soc. Sci. Res.
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EU-style arrangement of cap-and-trade is not likely to be feasible
for the United States.94 The United States has much greater
regional disparities in carbon emission intensities and income
levels, creating extreme difficulties on the path of establishing
cap-and-trade legislation.95 The individual states of the United
States and the countries of the EU are designated as either
“green” states or “brown” states.96 Green states have higher per
capita income and lower emission intensities.97 Brown states
have lower income and higher emission intensities.98 The EUETS was initially established by only fifteen West-European
states–each of which were considered “green” states.99 The EUETS was able to expand to twelve more states because EU
membership required them to do so, offering these “brown” states
valuable economic benefits to compensate any economic risks
taken by joining the scheme.100 Ten northeast states of the
United States (all “green” states)101 have developed a cap-andtrade program under their Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI),102 and California’s Assembly Bill 32 proposes a similar

Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1952769.
94. David Wheeler, Confronting the American Divide on Carbon Emissions
Regulation (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 232, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1824509.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 1-2.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 3-4 (comparing the initial EU-15 to the U.S. RGGI states,
acknowledging the successes of small, regional cap-and-trade systems).
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id.
102. See Fact Sheet: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), REG’L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, INC. (2010), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/
RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf (noting that RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based
carbon emission reduction program in the United States. This cap-and-trade
program has capped carbon emissions and intends to reduce CO 2 emissions from
the power sector by 10% by the year 2018. The participating states include
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Because RGGI only limits emissions from
the power sector, monitoring costs are low); see also Lawrence Fogel, Serving a
“Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs Should Survive a
Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2010)
(noting problems of RGGI’s design include a potentially severe leakage problem

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8

16

596

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

strategy for that state.103
Unfortunately, the interstate
disparities of the United States immensely surpass those of the
EU.104 As noted by Wheeler, the United States does not have the
resources to incentivize the “brown” states to join these cap-andtrade programs, and without economic incentives, these states
are not likely to accept limits on emissions.105 In a direct
comparison, the United States’ “green” states make up only 32%
of U.S. carbon emissions, so without the full participation of the
“brown” states, carbon emission limits would only account for
one-third of the United States’ emissions.106
As we have reached a time of “do or die” in the eyes of
environmentalists, we cannot afford to play with a system that is
largely untested and very likely ineffective. The United States
used a cap-and-trade system for the reduction of acid rain in the
1990s, but we have never used this type of system to curb
emissions that come from such a variety of sources.107 The capand-trade market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions was not a

due to the regional nature of the program (as well as the interconnectedness of
the electricity markets, and a very limited scope of coverage with its
downstream monitoring)).
103. See Wheeler, supra note 94 (stating that California is also considered a
“green” state). California Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act,
was passed and signed into law in 2006. The Bill sets the goal of carbon
emission reductions into law, requiring that California adopt measures to
reduce carbon emission levels down to the 1990 levels by the year 2020. The
Scoping Plan was adopted in 2008 and provides an outline for actions to reduce
GHG emissions in California. This Plan identifies cap-and-trade as one of the
strategies for reducing GHG emissions. The California Air Resources Board
(ARB) has been working to design a cap-and-trade program through the
Western Climate Initiative (a collaboration of six western states and four
Canadian provinces). According to Assembly Bill 32, the ARB must begin the
adopted cap-and-trade program in 2012. See Cap-and-Trade Program, CA.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
capandtrade.htm (last reviewed Jan. 31, 2013); see also Chris M. Amantea &
Rafael Figuerido, California’s Climate-Change Regulation and Related
Regulations, Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook §48:2 (2010); see generally Stavins, supra
note 7.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Wheeler, supra note 94.
106. Id. at 6.
107. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 34.
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true success, and in July of 2010, the sulfur market collapsed.108
Sulfur dioxide emission allowances traded for as much as $1,600
per ton before dropping to less than $3 per ton.109 In fact, many
argue that the entire program had misleading environmental
effects.110 The focus of the project was the reduction of acid rain
through the reduction of SO2 emissions. As a result, low-sulfur
coal from the West was introduced to replace high-sulfur coal
from the East and Midwest.111 While this achieved the desired
reduction of SO2 emissions, this new coal introduced new forms of
pollution from the need to transport this coal to the industrialized
regions in the East and Midwest.112 Increased amounts of this
coal are required to achieve the same level of energy, and the
pollution associated with cross-country transportation increased
overall carbon emissions.113 In conclusion, the failed SO2 market
leads me to conclude that we have no experience with a successful
cap-and-trade system.
C. Previous Cap-and-Trade Proposals
A deeper analysis of the cap-and-trade system finds that the
literature has not paid sufficient attention to the feasibility of a
carbon cap-and-trade program. During the 110th Congress, three
climate change bills were considered in the U.S. Senate: the Low
Carbon Economy Act of 2007 (the Bingaman-Specter bill),
America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (the Lieberman-Warner
bill), and the Manager’s Amendment to the Lieberman-Warner
bill (the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008).114
These bills were broad-based, cap-and-trade climate change bills
that, due to political disagreements and the overhanging
108. Joseph Bast, Cap-and-Trade’s Market Failure, AM. THINKER, July 28,
2010, http://www.americanthinker.com/archived-articles/../2010/07/capandtrade
_market_failure.html.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Kenneth R. Richards & Stephanie Richards, The Evolution and Anatomy
of Recent Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate: Critique and
Recommendations (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368903.
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economic crisis, the Senate did not pass.115 In order to determine
the best form of climate change legislation, previous legislation
must be analyzed. Identifying the key elements of climate change
legislation and the policy principles for developing that legislation
can give law and policymakers direction for the formation of new
legislation, as well as insight into some of the pitfalls to be
avoided.116 The Bingaman-Specter bill and both LiebermanWarner bills identify major issues to be addressed by any form of
climate change legislation. However, all three bills contain
elements that require a great deal of additional refinement. The
Manager’s Amendment contains many sound climate change
policy principles, but there is still a great deal of room for
improvement.117 Unfortunately, the complexities involved with
the implementation of a cap-and-trade program make it
extremely difficult to draft an adequate bill.
The Waxman-Markey bill introduced titles outlining
strategies concerning clean energy, energy efficiency, reducing
global warming pollution, transitioning to a clean energy
economy, and providing for agriculture and forestry related
offsets.118 Some of the key provisions of the bill included the
following: (1) creating a combined energy efficiency and
renewable electricity standard that would require electricity
suppliers to increase the use of renewable electricity to 20% of
their demand by 2020; (2) setting up a strategic plan to improve
overall U.S. energy productivity by at least 2.5% per year by 2012
and sustaining that improvement rate through the year 2030;
and (3) establishing a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions
and setting goals for emission reductions from covered industries
by 83% of the 2005 levels by 2050.119

115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3 (listing some of the Manager’s Amendment policy principles
considered “sound”).
118. Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural
Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405 (2011).
119. H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454#overview (last
updated June 26, 2009).
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a. Waxman-Markey
Waxman-Markey was the leading cap-and-trade proposal to
date, but it failed to pass through the Senate primarily due to the
complicated and bureaucratic nature of the bill. Prior to its
failure, the bill was scrutinized for its potential effectiveness.
The IPCC proposed that emissions should be reduced between
25% and 40% below the 1990 levels by 2020 for the purpose of
stabilizing GHG concentrations and to prevent further
environmental damage.120 The enacted legislation would only
achieve a maximum of a 23% reduction in emissions by 2020 and
the cap-and-trade system would only achieve a 1% reduction from
1990 levels by 2020.121 Other estimates of the legislation’s
emissions reductions are significantly lower.122 The considerable
uncertainty that surrounds possible climate change effects, and
those information and technology gaps that have plagued past
and present cap-and-trade systems are thought to be similarly
present in the Waxman-Markey bill.123 These unresolved issues
will not suffice in adequate climate change legislation.
D. International Agreements on Climate Change
In response to the harmful effects of climate change, the
United Nations adopted the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.124 During
the meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto,
Japan, delegates agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that
established legal commitments for industrialized countries and

120. IPCC, supra note 2.
121. John Larsen & Robert Heilmayr, Emission Reductions Under Cap-andTrade Proposals in the 111th Congress, WORLD RES. INST. (June 25, 2009),
available at http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2009-06-25.pdf.
122. See Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey: Climate Bill Not ScienceBased; Benefits Polluters, GREENPEACE USA, June 25, 2009, http://www.green
peace.org/usa/en/media-center/news-releases/greenpeace-opposes-waxmanmark/ (releasing a statement announcing its opposition to the Waxman-Markey
bill on the basis that the bill would fail to achieve the effective reduction in GHG
emissions as proposed).
123. Larsen & Heilmayr, supra note 121.
124. Soledad Aguilar et al., Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., COP 17 Final, 12
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., no. 534, Dec. 13, 2011, at 1.
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countries in transition to achieve emission reduction targets.125
These countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by an
average of 5.2% below their 1990 levels during the first
commitment period (2008-2012).126 The Kyoto Protocol was
entered into force in 2005 and has 193 parties.127 This Protocol
establishes a very complex and ambitious regime, but the states
that have been willing to assume emission targets under the
Protocol represent only about a quarter of the world’s GHG
emissions.128 On December 31, 2012, the Kyoto Protocol’s first
commitment period ended.129 In preparation for the expiration of
this commitment period, an ad hoc working group was
established in 2005 to negotiate further commitments for a
second commitment period.130
a. Bali
In 2007, the COP 13 met in Bali, Indonesia and adopted the
Bali Action Plan and the Bali Roadmap.131 The Action Plan
focused on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and longterm cooperative action.132 The Roadmap set a deadline for
concluding the negotiation for December 2009 at the Copenhagen
Climate Change Conference.133
b. Copenhagen
During the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009,
the Copenhagen Accord was presented for adoption by the
delegates.134 The Copenhagen Accord was a political agreement
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond 12
(Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Harv. Project on Climate Agreements, Policy Brief,
2011), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21314/
whither_the_kyoto_protocol_durban_and_beyond.html.
129. Id. at 1.
130. Id.
131. Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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that established a bottom-up approach to mitigation efforts in
which countries define their own national climate change
approach and pledge their commitment.135
Delegates at
Copenhagen disputed the transparency of the negotiating
process, and the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted.136
Instead, the parties agreed to extend the time for countries to
gather their national emission reduction targets and mitigation
actions and prepare for the COP 16 meeting.137
c. Cancun
The U.N. Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico,
took place from November 29 to December 11, 2010.138 During
this meeting, the parties finalized the Cancun Agreements.139
Cancun formally puts the pledges of the Copenhagen Conference
into U.N. documentation, although they may increase or decrease
in the future.140 More importantly, developing countries agreed
to look at ways they could reduce emissions in the future.
However, those developing countries did not make specific
pledges.141
The Cancun Agreements analyzed mitigation
measuring, reporting, and verification, and addressed
deforestation and forest degradation, the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks.142 Finally, a new climate green fund was created
to transfer money from developed countries to developing
countries in order to reduce the impacts of climate change.143
The Green Climate Fund was slated to begin in 2011; however, no
specific amount of money was allocated to fund it.144 While
Cancun touched on many important issues, the big issue of the

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Bodansky, supra note 128, at 4.
Id.
Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Bodansky, supra note 128, at 4.
Id.
Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 2.
Id.
Id.
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future of the Kyoto Protocol was extended to the U.N. Climate
Change Conference in Durban.145
d. Durban
The outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in
Durban yielded a decision by the parties to adopt a universal,
legally-binding framework on climate change to be completed by
2015 and enacted in 2020.146 This agreement, known as the
Durban Platform, is noted for including the United States (which
did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol) and the developing countries of
The Durban Conference also showed
China and India.147
progress regarding the Green Climate Fund;148 adopting a
management framework with an objective to raise $100 billion a
year by 2020 to assist developing countries in adaptation and
mitigation practices to counter global warming and climate
change.149
As seen through the scheme of International Climate Change
agreements, the intention of the UNFCCC is pure, and the efforts
are correctly aimed. The difficulties show up in the attempts to
bring the world together and form binding agreements. A
common trend in these international climate change conferences
is to push back difficult decisions. While we may be headed down
a worthy path, these current global climate change initiatives are
working too slowly.
IV. CARBON TAX IS SUPERIOR TO CAP-AND-TRADE
The global climate change problem continues to apply
pressure for the enactment of climate change legislation. In the
following paragraphs, I will further expand on why a carbon tax
trumps cap-and-trade in the following categories: (1) benefit
certainty and cost certainty, (2) length of legislation, (3)
implementation, (4) enforcement, (5) revenue and reinvestment,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Aguilar et al., supra note 124, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
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(6) coordination with existing laws, and (7) environmental
effectiveness. This tax should be implemented as soon as possible
in the form of a carbon tax with reinvestment.
A. Benefit Certainty and Cost Certainty
Cap-and-trade and carbon tax are both market-based
mechanisms designed to reduce GHG emissions, but it is an
ongoing debate as to which of these two mechanisms will prevail
in climate change legislation.
There are many differences
between cap-and-trade and carbon tax, but at the heart of the
issue is one fundamental difference: benefit certainty versus cost
certainty.
A cap-and-trade system places a cap on the level of emissions
permitted. This cap states that its implementation will provide
environmental benefits from the achieved emission reductions.
This is referred to as “benefit certainty.”150 A carbon tax sets up
an exact price on carbon emissions. This amount is set in
advance so that emitters are always aware of the price of
emissions. Thus, the carbon tax provides “cost certainty.”151
Cap-and-trade does not give cost certainty, as the market may
fluctuate over time.152 In theory, the price stability of a carbon
tax could prove as much as five times more cost-efficient than
cap-and-trade.153 Additionally, the “benefit certainty” of the caps
is an unconvincing advantage if emissions are not actually capped
at a sustainable level and if the regulations provide no incentive
for over compliance, even when emission prices are very low.154
Carbon taxes, on the other hand, provide no “benefit certainty,”
though there is no question that they are able to maintain “cost
certainty.”155 The argument over which “certainty” is more
important becomes irrelevant when cap-and-trade becomes

150. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Kenneth C. Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A Consensus Perspective
on the Tax-Versus-Cap Debate (Working Paper Series, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1154638.
154. Id.
155. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32.
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plagued by political intervention and safety valves and is unable
to provide the “benefit certainty” of a fixed cap.156
B. Length of the Legislation
Cap-and-trade bills are infamously long and complicated.
The Liebermann-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 is over
three hundred pages in length,157 and Waxman-Markey is almost
500.158 This is appearing to be the norm among similar cap-andtrade proposals. While there are fewer carbon tax proposals, they
are significantly shorter and simpler. The leading carbon tax
proposal, sponsored by U.S. Representative John B. Larson, is
seventeen pages in length.159 Climate change laws must be
specific enough to remedy the problems our country is facing.
However, legislation that is too complicated with too much
specificity will create additional problems. The longer the text of
the law, the less likely it will be that the text is read and fully
understood by the public.160 Long, complicated laws tend to draw
suspicion from citizens regarding hidden clauses, like the creation
of benefits for favored parties, or disadvantages for those
opposing the legislators.161 All in all, cap-and-trade bills leave
wide gaps for modifications and loop holes.
C. Implementation
Aside from the write-up, cap-and-trade is extremely
complicated to enact. The cap must be imposed “upstream,”
which means that the majority of the population is only affected
indirectly because the tax is applied on the producer rather than
on the final product.162 Also, while the upstream approach
156. Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives in a New
Climate Agreement (Belfer Ctr. Sci. & Int’l Aff., Working Paper, 2008) (prepared
for The Climate Dialogue, Copenhagen, Denmark).
157. Richards & Richards, supra note 114.
158. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
159. Richards & Richards, supra note 114.
160. Waggoner, supra note 8, at 1261.
161. Id.
162. See Aldy & Stavins, supra note 156, at 1 (defining the product cycle of
fossil fuels. “Upstream” monitoring occurs at the sites of fossil fuel suppliers.
“Upstream” monitoring requires fewer monitoring sites and results in lower
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reduces the complexity brought by a large number of sources, the
system remains complex.163 First, the cap-and-trade system
requires baselines to be set for the establishment of a cap. Next,
regulators must decide how allowances will be created and
distributed.164 The options for this distribution include free
dispersal or auctioned allowances. Free allowance distribution
requires regulators to decide which industries receive allowances,
but an auction requires complex monitoring to prevent fraud.165
Third, further monitoring must be set up for the trading of
allowances.
Control must be stringent so that the same
allowance cannot be used more than once.166 Enforcement
policies must be implemented to penalize those that exceed their
allowances.
Further, one must implement a transnational
enforcement regime if allowances are traded internationally.
Finally, provisions are typically set for the banking and
borrowing of allowances.167 Some of these provisions also allow
for a safety valve to prevent extreme cost uncertainty.168 If
offsets are to be allowed for carbon sequestration and storage, or
similar projects, this must also be included in a provision. The
many requirements of a cap-and-trade system create extreme
complexities that take time to work out. The more complex the
program becomes, the more difficult it will be for the proposal to
pass into law. In all aspects, a cap-and-trade system is much
more complicated than a carbon tax. A successful cap-and-trade
program requires intense monitoring and reporting mechanisms.
Unfortunately, our current monitoring technologies are not
sufficient to take on the task of such an expansive pollutant as
carbon.169

implementation costs but greater uncertainty. “Downstream” monitoring occurs
at the point of final GHG emissions. This type of monitoring requires greater
expenses, as the number of sites greatly increases through the product cycle).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8.
166. Id.
167. Aldy & Stavins, supra note 156.
168. Id.
169. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8.
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D. Enforcement
Adding to the extensive list of the complexities surrounding
cap-and-trade is the extreme difficulty of enforcement. A carbon
tax identifies every person as a polluter, whereas a cap-and-trade
only identifies select industries as polluters.170 Under cap-andtrade, monitoring creates many unseen costs and difficulties.
Administrative costs are often overlooked, but remain crucial
when looking at the costs of emission-reducing actions. The costs
of establishing the cap-and-trade program include, but are not
limited to, educating the targeted industries, monitoring
emissions and compliance, and enforcing the policy.171 To reduce
costs as much as possible, regulators must strive for minimal
administrative efforts. This usually means that approaches that
require monitoring fewer parties and use more readily available
information are the most favored.172 This leads to a tradeoff
between the extent of a program’s coverage of emission sources
and the administrative costs in order to achieve administratively
simpler programs. New costs will continue to appear in the
creation of a nation-wide cap-and-trade program, but an
additional concern lies in our monitoring technologies. In capand-trade, an elaborate system would need to be created to
distribute and collect allowances to prevent cheating. This is an
extremely difficult and complicated task. Effective measures to
penalize those that emit without allowances may be even more
difficult. Cap-and-trade will require the creation of a completely
new governmental body to take on these administrative and
monitoring activities.173 The carbon tax, on the other hand, can
be enforced by the IRS and the EPA with their existing staff and
extensive experience dealing with excise taxes and clean energy,
respectively.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 6.
Id. at 5.
Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 8.
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E. Revenue and Reinvestment
A carbon tax in any form will generate revenue. As an
example, a tax of $10 per ton of carbon (a very modest tax) is
predicted to generate $50 billion per year.174 In theory, the
higher the tax, the higher the revenue that will be generated.
How this revenue is used plays a large role in the equity of the
tax. While carbon taxes are criticized for potentially having
regressive effects, cap-and-trade also faces this burden. In a
performed study, U.S. households were broken down into income
groups and regional groups.
The study captured regional
differences in heating and electricity costs, with the results
demonstrating that the distribution of tax revenues has a huge
role in the regressive nature of the carbon tax.175
Sound policy must take into account the political constraints
that burden all new legislation. Distributional issues, differences
in values, or differences in beliefs of the programs’ outcomes can
cause political indecision.176 Low-income households spend a
greater percentage of their income on energy than do higherincome households.177 This means that those lower-income
groups will be hit harder by a rise in energy prices. In addition,
states that are more reliant on coal, like those in the Midwest,
will have a greater role in carbon dioxide emissions reductions.178
The best policies must accommodate these political issues, while
not compromising the cost-effectiveness principles.179 Carbon
taxes, with price stability, guarantee revenue that can be
returned to the public in order to provide a payback for the
taxation.180

174. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 40.
175. DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE INCIDENCE OF
U.S. CLIMATE POLICY: WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT (2008),
available at http://www.mistra-research.se/download/18.87749a811cbd4c4fb48
0001008/Burtraw+et+al+2008+a.pdf.
176. Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 7.
177. See BURTRAW ET AL., supra note 175, at 1; see also Corbett A. Grainger &
Charles D. Kolstad, Who Pays for a Carbon Tax? (Dec. 1, 2008) (on file with
Univ. of Cal. at Santa Barbara, Dep’t of Econ.).
178. Richards & Richards, supra note 114, at 8.
179. See id.
180. Mann, supra note 25.
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F. Coordination with Existing Law
New legislation in the United States must be aware of
existing legislations and regulations to avoid conflict. The Clean
Air Act could prove to be problematic with new climate change
regulation.181 In terms of international law, any new climate
change legislation must be designed to accommodate existing
international agreements to which the United States is a party.
The legislation must also be sure to abide by those international
trade laws set by the WTO.182 As it will be relying on existing tax
laws and utilizing existing governmental bodies, a carbon tax will
nestle comfortably within existing law. Cap-and-trade, on the
other hand, may face further complications in order to avoid
potential conflict, especially if we intend to coordinate with the
regimes of other nations’ programs, like the EU-ETS.183
Exchanging allowances across borders will create immense
enforcement difficulties as well as monitoring problems. Carbon
taxes are easily collected on imports, and because the tax is also
imposed on domestic production, it remains compliant with the
WTO trade laws.184
G. Environmental Effectiveness
In terms of climate change, all players are polluters, but not
to the same level.185 Overall, the scramble to create and enact a
form of domestic climate change regulation has blinded some as
to the true purpose of the regulation. Climate change regulation
is meant to mandate carbon and GHG emission reductions with
the state of the environment and the public’s health as the main
focus. Unfortunately, the race to pass a new piece of legislation
has given way to political influence that is skewing the goals of

181. Chris Amantea, Clean Air Act [1], Cal. Bus. Law Deskbook §44.5 (2010).
182. Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling
Tensions Between Fair Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 71 (2006).
183. See Katie Miles, International Investment Law and Climate Change:
Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon World (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law,
Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154588.
184. Carlarne, supra note 182, at 71.
185. Tol, supra note 57, at 1259.
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proposed regulations. For example, both carbon tax and cap-andtrade bills have failed to give proof of any real emission
reductions. Carbon taxes work off the assumption that a tax, by
increasing the cost of carbon use throughout the chain of
distribution, will discourage that use and cause the public to find
alternate means of production.186 Cap-and-trade assumes that
market-based policies will provide strong incentives for the
investment into new technologies, and thereby create an overall
reduction in emissions.187 The problem with these assumptions
is just that: they are assumptions. There is no firm data to show
that putting a price on carbon will reduce emissions. The EUETS has created a carbon market, but the successes are
economical rather than environmental.188 The existing systems
are not up to par. What we need is something simple and
feasible, but also something extremely effective at fixing the
problem at hand.

V. CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT
A. Everyone is an Emitter so Everyone Pays
Existing carbon tax proposals, and especially existing capand-trade proposals, are not capable of reducing carbon emissions
with certainty. New regulation must be proactive in nature,
include all emitters, and guarantee real reductions in carbon

186. Waggoner, supra note 8, at 1259.
187. See generally Stavins, supra note 7; see also Tess Schwartz et al., Legal
Issues for Carbon-Related Transactions: Regulations, Markets, Technology &
Enhancing Value (Practising Law Inst., Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series, No. 18722, 2009).
188. Data regarding the emissions reductions resulting from the EU-ETS are
inconsistent due to the lack of technologies capable of precise monitoring. See
Peter Heindl, The Impact of Informational Costs in Quantity Regulation of
Pollutants: The Case of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 25 (Ctr. for
European Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 11-040, 2011), available at
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp11040.pdf (acknowledging the high costs
and complexity of the technologies required for emission monitoring, as well as
the lack of informational distribution among the countries of the EU-ETS.
Heindl proposes that the lack of predictability of informational and abatement
costs could cause firms to delay investments into new technologies).
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emissions. A better, more effective market-based approach for
reducing carbon emissions is a carbon tax with reinvestment.
This carbon tax with reinvestment would directly tax all carbon
emitters through a downstream approach, as opposed to cap-andtrade’s limited upstream proposals. This tax accounts for the
societal costs of carbon emissions, and through this accountability
promotes emission reductions just like cap-and-trade. However,
the reinvestment part of the tax will offset any doubts regarding
the social responsibility requirement of emission reduction
proposals. The monetary payment of a carbon tax is a payoff of
the environmental and societal costs imposed from emitting
carbon, and sends the message about the harm of carbon
emissions.
If that is not clear enough, the carbon tax’s
reinvestment into the immediate construction of environmentally
friendlier energy production facilities will further emphasize this
message.
B. How Does the Tax Function?
A carbon tax with reinvestment is fundamentally simple. A
tax starts at $5 per ton of carbon contained within the product
based on emissions intensity. The tax is measured at the source,
but carried downstream and paid at the register. Based on
emissions intensity, everyone is an emitter and therefore no one
is exempt from the tax. Then every year the tax rate increases by
$5 per ton of carbon.189 Despite an analysis remarking on the
ability of increasing taxes to reduce future- and short-term
emissions,190 the carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on
public option to reduce GHG emissions. The assumption that
taxation will encourage voluntary innovation in the power sector
is not sufficient. To assure emission reductions, the revenue from
the tax will be channeled to building new infrastructure for
energy production. Current power plants will be replaced by

189. See infra Figure 1, for the revenues calculated from the carbon tax,
beginning at $5/ton in year 1 and increasing by $5/ton each year until the tax
reaches $50/ton in year 10. The revenues are calculated as a percent of U.S.
GDP.
190. Habermacher & Kirchgässner, supra note 29.
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nuclear, geothermal, solar, and wind facilities, among others.191
There will be no added expense for the utilities, as they will not
be the ones bearing the cost of construction, and neither jobs nor
production will be lost.192 In fact, the construction of new
infrastructure will create jobs, and the tax collected will pay to
replace existing high emission power plant utilities. Replacing
high emission power plants with low-to-no emission power plants
will rapidly force emissions down. Over time, revenues will
decrease even though the tax is increasing193 because the newly
built, non-emitting energy facilities will not carry a carbon tax,
and energy prices will continue to drop. In twenty years, the
United States could achieve a 38.67% to 74.91% reduction in
carbon emissions across the building and utilities sector.194
Carbon tax with reinvestment will bring about an extreme payout
for all U.S. citizens. This payout will come in the form of clean
and cheap energy as the tax progresses and clean energy
infrastructure takes over. Also, regional disparities will be
corrected by targeting those coal-reliant areas with the first bouts
of infrastructure construction. The dirtiest coal plants will be the
first to be replaced.
VI. CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT TRUMPS
CAP-AND-TRADE
A carbon tax with reinvestment maintains the ease of
implementation and enforcement of previously discussed carbon
taxes, and the progressive increase of the tax allows the market
to adjust to the price change. This tax with reinvestment would
produce revenue that would be used for the immediate
construction of alternative energy production. Since the tax could
191. The logistics of this transfer of ownership go beyond the scope of this
paper, but will be discussed in a separate article.
192. See infra Figure 2, for the Calculated Power Plants Orders in MWe,
demonstrating the thousands of construction jobs that will be created in the
creation of new energy infrastructure.
193. See infra Figure 1. Once the tax peaks at $50/ton of carbon, the total tax
collected declines rapidly as emissions decline.
194. See infra Figure 3 and Table 1. Figure 3 uses the base case and shows
how emissions decline for utilities and buildings, as well as how total emissions
decline. The table shows calculated emissions based on the time it takes to
build power plants.
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become effective almost immediately, the carbon tax with
reinvestment would be the quickest way to reduce GHG
emissions. With the instability of energy prices and the economic
recession occurring across the nation, proposals for additional
taxation weighs heavily on the American people. The cap-andtrade system will act just like a tax, and, as stated, the political
advantages of the cap-and-trade system are deceptive. Both capand-trade and carbon tax approaches will initially affect energy
prices.
The difference, however, is that this carbon tax’s
reinvestment guarantees that the energy prices will fall
significantly as alternative energy projects continue to be built at
no cost to the utilities.
A. Cap-and-Trade with Reinvestment?
In theory, cap-and-trade can also be used to generate revenue
that is equal to the amount generated by a carbon tax.195 If all
allowances are auctioned, the revenue created would likely be
equivalent to that of a carbon tax. If this were the case, a
reinvestment provision identical to that of my proposed carbon
tax could be created for cap-and-trade. However, all cap-andtrade proposals introduced into Congress, those existing cap-andtrade programs in the U.S. and abroad, and most academic
proposals call for some free distribution of allowances.196 The
EU-ETS distributed 95% of the allowances for free while most
congressional proposals call for over half of the allowances to be
free.197 The reason for this free dispersal is the attraction of
complete governmental control of providing allowances to the
sectors that are considered most important for our nation.
Nonetheless, free distribution of allowances means less revenue
generated. This means that reinvestment would have little effect
on creating clean energy. Moreover, the appeal of free allowances
seems counterproductive for the ultimate goal of emission
reduction. It is probable that some industries will receive too
many allowances.198 This will negatively affect the trading price
195.
196.
197.
198.

Driesen, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of allowances, leading to a repeat of the EU-ETS. Politicians in
Europe created so many free allowances that the industries were
not required to make any changes to their emissions. The price
on allowances was next to nothing, and the EU failed to meet its
goals under the Kyoto Protocol.199 In terms of a carbon tax, the
process of creating tax exemptions would be equivalent to the free
distribution of allowances. To maintain fairness and simplicity,
the carbon tax with reinvestment will offer no exemptions. The
tax will be applied to all goods and services. Everyone is a
polluter, so everyone will pay.
The objective of the carbon tax with reinvestment is what
makes this tax so much more appealing and feasible in combating
climate change. The carbon tax with reinvestment starts low
($5/ton), increases annually until it reaches $50/ton to allow the
construction market to adjust, the revenues peak and then begin
to decline rapidly as emissions decline.200 As stated, excise
taxation is not a new concept for the United States. For this
reason, no new organizations will be created for tax regulation
purposes. The carbon tax with reinvestment will be implemented
and regulated by the IRS and the EPA, using the existing,
knowledgeable staff.
Our economy and lifestyle are dependent on infrastructure
and energy. A properly structured tax on carbon with the goal of
building a new energy economy would protect our economic and
national interests, create many jobs,201 and result in significant
decreases in GHG emissions.202 Previously proposed carbon
taxes did have “benefit certainty” because the price of emissions
could not guarantee that emissions would be reduced.203 A
carbon tax with reinvestment does not rely on public
accountability for carbon emission reductions. Instead, it relies
on the construction and development of clean, alternative energy
power plants for the reduction of GHG emissions.204 Until now,

199. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 42.
200. See infra Figure 1, for Estimated Revenues.
201. See infra Figure 2.
202. See infra Figure 3, for Emission Reductions.
203. Mann, supra note 16, at 45.
204. See infra Figure 3, showing emissions declining for utilities and
buildings.
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there was no obvious advantage to either system; one had to
choose “cost certainty” or “benefit certainty.” A carbon tax with
reinvestment has both. For this simple reason, we would be
foolish not to immediately enact this tax.
B. An Example to Follow
Greenhouse gases are not stationery. They travel across the
world, making climate change a global issue.205 Without the
efforts of all industrialized and industrializing nations to reduce
GHG emissions, the atmospheric concentrations of these gases
will likely double the level of pre-industrialized emissions before
the end of the century.206 There is a need for international
coordination, and the Kyoto Protocol207 is not proving to be the
answer. This is just one more reason the carbon tax with
reinvestment is a necessary solution for climate change.
a. A Global Problem Requires a Global Solution
The carbon tax with reinvestment will be imposed on all
domestic products as well as imports. The environmental cost of
shipping products overseas is an area that is often overlooked.
Agreements under the Kyoto Protocol have allowed fuel for
international freight to avoid liability for emissions.208 The
resulting issue is that goods exported across the world emit an
overwhelming amount of GHGs without penalty. A 2009 report
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimated that
2.7% of the world’s total carbon emissions in 2007 were the result
205. Hans Gersbach & Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 2807, 2009).
206. Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011)
(citing IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf).
207. See David Wooley & Elizabeth Morss, Global Climate Change, in CLEAN
AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 10:1 (2011) (discussing that the Kyoto Protocol expires in
2012, so negotiations are underway to reach a new agreement. As of yet, no new
agreement has been implemented, including any additional reductions to be
required by Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries).
208. Oliver J. A. Howitt et al., Carbon Emissions from International Cruise
Ship Passengers’ Travel to and from New Zealand, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2552 (May
2010).
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of international shipping.209 Burning oil in the form of heavy fuel
oil, as well as marine diesel oil, releases large amounts of CO 2,
SO2, NOx, and hydrocarbons, as well as smaller amounts of
particulate matter, into the environment, contributing to global
climate change.210 The carbon tax with reinvestment will tax the
amount of carbon emissions given off during shipping, along with
the emission emitted during production.
b. Carbon Tax with Reinvestment will Comply
with International Law
In his book, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating
the Unseen Polluters, Benjamin Richardson states that, “[t]he
investment community continues to downplay inclusion of
environmental and social criteria for consideration in corporate
financing decisions.”211 Consistent with his thought is the
argument that international investment law poses potential
barriers to climate change regulation.212 Miles identifies several
cases where investment laws have trumped environmental
protection efforts,213 noting that in any conflict between the
209. Id. (citing CORBETT O. BUHAUG ET AL., INT’L MAR. ORG. (IMO), SECOND
IMO GHG STUDY 2009, 6 (2009), available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData
.asp?doc_id=12612&filename=GHG%20StudyFINAL.pdf).
210. Id.
211. BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW:
REGULATING THE UNSEEN POLLUTERS 6 (2008).
212. Miles, supra note 183, at 3.
213. Id. at 11-19 (discussing examples: (1) Metalclad Corp. v. United States of
Mexico (citing Metalclald v. United States of Mexico, Award, 40 I.L.M. 35
(2000)), where an American investor brought a claim against Mexico, alleging
expropriation of investment and a breach of fair and equitable treatment
standards regarding the declaration of an ecological preserve surrounding the
hazardous waste treatment site. The tribunal held that Mexico had not acted
with the required levels of transparency consistent with NAFTA, and was
therefore in breach of fair and equitable treatment standards. (2) Azuris Corp.
v. Republic of Arg. (citing Azurix Corp. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award (2006)), where Azurix contaminated the local water supply,
causing the water to be undrinkable. Local authorities imposed a fine on Azurix
for non-compliance with its obligations of water quality, and Azurix filed a
request for arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the action taken by the local
authorities resulted in expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treatment
standards. Azurix also claimed that the water problems were the result of poor
infrastructure due to the failures of the local authorities. The tribunal, in short,
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interests of investors and climate change regulation measures,
very little weight is given to international environmental
issues.214 The potential for claims of indirect expropriation,
discriminatory treatment, and breaches of fair and equitable
treatment threaten climate change mitigation methods that
include the allocation of permits or “rights to pollute.”215 Under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade / World Trade
Organization (GATT/WTO) regime, world trade must follow three
fundamental obligations. The first is the most-favored-nation
(MFN) principle, which requires any advantage that is provided
to a product to be provided to all like products. The second
principle, the national treatment principle, requires that foreign
products be treated no less favorably than domestic products.
The third principle is most relevant for cap-and-trade. The
prohibition on quantitative restrictions prevents countries from
using embargoes, quotas, or licensing schemes on imported and
With a cap-and-trade system, these
exported products.216
international investment and trade laws are a true threat. If
held that the actions of the local authorities breached fair and equitable
treatment. (3) Methanex (citing Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M.
1345 (2005)), where a Canadian investor challenged the health and
environmental regulation in the United States after the Governor of California
issued an order declaring that the Canadian ethanol manufacturer Methanex’s
fuel additive would be phased out by 2002 for contamination reasons. Methanex
filed a complaint under NAFTA. However, the tribunal rejected Methanex’s
arguments. Although the ultimate decision found in favor of California’s
position, Miles points to the flaw of the system, seeing as the claim proceeded to
a hearing at all. (4) Santa Elena (citing Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa
Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, 39 I.L.M. 1317 (2000)), where a Costa
Rican company that had been formed by American stockholders was
expropriated by Costa Rica. The issue was not the expropriation, but rather the
amount of compensation due to the Company. Costa Rica claimed the right to
expropriate due to the ecological diversity of the surrounding land. The tribunal
held that the environmental objectives made no difference to the application of
international investment rules.).
214. Miles, supra note 183, at 19.
215. Id. at 27; see also Jacob Werksman et al., Will International Investment
Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean
Development Mechanism, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 59
(2003).
216. Erik P. Bartenhagen, The Intersection of Trade and the Environment: An
Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Ecolabeling Programs, 17
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 61 (1997) (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 195, art. XI [hereinafter GATT]).
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imports were to be included, and thereby limited, under a capand-trade system, an import quota would be implied. Setting
quotas violates WTO law.217 However, this will not be the case
with the carbon tax with reinvestment. With an across-the-board
tax on set quantities of carbon, there are no issues of
discrimination or equity, nor is there an issue of violating WTO
laws forbidding taxes on imports, “in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”218 As long as the
taxes are paid, companies are under no obligation to change or
experience indirect expropriation. A key challenge is to ensure
that the objectives of these areas of law are able to align, rather
than cross, in order to move forward to reduce the effects of
climate change.219 The simplicity of the system will allow the
carbon tax with reinvestment to avoid clashing with the everfavored international investment laws.
The effectiveness of a carbon tax with reinvestment on the
international level could benefit the United States in several
ways. First, effective emission reductions would mitigate the
negative environmental and social health impacts of climate
change.220
Second, the tax will encourage economic
advancements through infrastructure development and new job
creation. Finally, the international effects resulting from the
carbon tax with reinvestment will assist the United States in
maintaining its standing as a world leader.221
VII. CONCLUSION
The need for a climate change policy that truly addresses the
issue of climate change is increasingly evident. A carbon tax
system is the best approach for the United States due to the
simplicity of the design and ease of implementation, cost
certainty, price stability, and the ability to generate revenue for
the public good. However, a carbon tax must assure reductions in

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

GATT, at art. XI: b.
GATT, at art. III: 2.
See generally Miles, supra note 183.
Young, supra note 7.
Id.
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GHG emissions, and must target all polluters. Until now, there
has not been a carbon tax capable of these requirements.
Literature argues that the cap-and-trade system is the
superior choice because of the historical successes of the system.
As stated, the U.S. acid rain program is one of those cited
examples,222 but in reality, this is a poor example. We have never
had an economy-wide cap-and-trade system. Currently, the EUETS is the only comparable wide-range cap-and-trade example.
However, it would be unwise to enact a cap-and-trade system
based on the flawed cap-and-trade system adopted by the EU.223
Conversely, our nation is very experienced with economy-wide
excise taxes. In his tax bill, Congressman Larson simply added
three new, relatively short sections to the existing excise tax
section of the Internal Revenue Code.224 With regards to carbon
cap-and-trade, there is no adequate piece of legislation. Previous
proposals have shown just how difficult it is to draft a bill for capand-trade, and even if a bill were to be flawlessly designed, it is
suggested that it would take at least two years to get the program
through Congress and set up for implementation because of the
delays in rulemaking.225 A carbon tax, utilizing the existing
excise tax laws, could basically be enacted tomorrow. We have
already delayed our efforts to combat climate change, and we do
not have the time to continue the delay by attempting to
surmount all the obstacles set out by cap-and-trade legislation.
Immediate action can only be achieved by a carbon tax.
The carbon tax with reinvestment implements a downstream
tax so that no person will be exempt from taxation. The revenue
produced by the tax will be used for the immediate construction of
low- or non-emitting power sources like nuclear, geothermal,
wind, and solar facilities.
With the creation of new, clean energy sources, the
environment will benefit from the guaranteed emission

222. Scotchmer, supra note 6 (describing the Acid Rain Program).
223. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 32, at 50; see also George Daskalakis
& Raphael N. Markellos, Are the European Carbon Markets Efficient?, 17 REV.
OF FUTURES MARKETS 103 (2008) (explaining why EU-ETS is not the success it
claims to be).
224. Richards & Richards, supra note 114.
225. Zhang, supra note 42.
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reductions. The public will benefit from the cheap energy prices
that will arise from the new infrastructure. The economy will
benefit from the creation of new jobs, and the nation will set a
great example that will be followed by those nations that wish to
continue exporting to the United States. Because the successes of
the tax will encourage other countries to implement similar
regulations, the carbon tax with reinvestment goes beyond
domestic emission abatement and offers a global solution to
climate change.
VIII. CARBON TAX WITH REINVESTMENT MODELS
As shown in the data, I performed regulatory streamlining in
order to achieve a graphic range and to play with regulatory
risks. The data is set-up to represent nuclear, wind/solar, and
geothermal as the proposed clean energy facilities. The baseline
model (8-2-3) assumes that the development of a nuclear power
plant takes eight years (allowing two years for permitting, four
for construction, and two for testing), two years for wind/solar
(one year each for permitting and construction), and three years
for geothermal (two years for permitting and one for
construction). Because processes can happen quicker or slower
than expected, I included a range within the graph. It can be
noted that even with drastically slower results, the carbon tax
with reinvestment’s impact is significantly better than the
leading Waxman-Markey proposal.226 Preserving the traditional
benefits of a carbon tax, the carbon tax with reinvestment is the
best option for climate change legislation in the United States.

226. See infra Tables 1 & 2.
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Figure 1: Estimated Carbon Tax Revenues as a Percent of GDP (2013-2032)

This figure indicates revenues collected each year as a percentage of GDP.
Revenues are calculated as follows, starting at $5/ton of GHG emissions in year 1,
rising by $5/ton each year until the carbon tax rate reaches $50/ton in year 10. All
goods and services, domestic and imported, are taxed based on emissions intensity.
Emissions intensity is calculated as GDP/total economy emissions. From emissions
intensity or $ of output per ton of emissions it is then possible to calculate the
implied emissions for each good or service.
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Figure 2: Power Plant Purchases and Deliveries (Annual and Cumulative) in
MWe

This figure shows the amount of new power plants that can be ordered and
constructed each year using the revenues from the CTR. The construction line trails
orders indicating that a plant ordered needs to be constructed which takes a
significant amount of time. While not calculated, every billion dollars in
construction expenditure creates approximately 25,000 direct and indirect jobs, thus
creating a potentially valuable stimulus to the economy.
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Figure 3: Declining Emission Levels as Power Plants are Completed

This figure shows declining emissions in the Utility & Building sectors as well as
across the entire U.S. This figure assumes the base case scenario, i.e. 8-2-3, where
it takes eight, two, and three years respectively to order, permit, construct and bring
online the nuclear, solar/wind, or geothermal power plant.

Table 1: Building and Utility Emissions (United States) in Year 2032

U.S. Building & Utility
Emissions Based on
Construction Strategy
Business As Usual
Waxman-Markey
4-1-2 yrs
4-2-2 yrs
4-2-3 yrs
4-3-4 yrs
4-2-5 yrs
8-1-2 yrs
8-2-2 yrs
8-2-3 yrs
8-2-5 yrs

Building & Utility Emission Levels in
Year 2032 Compared to 2013
120.82%
69.97%
25.09%
25.19%
25.33%
25.86%
26.27%
32.7%
33.1%
33.4%
34.26%
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8-3-4 yrs
12-1-2 yrs
12-2-2 yrs
12-2-3 yrs
12-3-4 yrs
12-2-5 yrs
12-4-6 yrs
16-1-2 yrs
16-2-2 yrs
16-2-3 yrs
16-3-4 yrs
16-2-5 yrs

623

34.4%
46.77%
47.54%
48.00%
49.67%
49.9%
55.3%
57.77%
58.75%
59.29%
61.20%
61.33%

Note: The emissions level for Building & Utility Emissions depends on the path
taken in terms of how long it takes to permit, construct, test, and place new power
facilities online. As the tax structure moves from $5 to $50 per ton, with a
maximum of $50 for the CTR (assumed to occur in year 10), the first number is the
years for a nuclear power plant (with a range of 4-16 yrs), the second for solar/wind
power plants (1-4 yrs) and the last for geothermal power plants (2-6 yrs). These
numbers include the time to build transmission facilities if needed. Therefore, “41-2” is interpreted as follows, the model assumes it takes 4 years to build nuclear, 1
year to build large scale solar/wind, and 2 years to build geothermal power plants.
Furthermore, all models exceed the proposed emissions reductions under WaxmanMarkey. The primary difference is that these emissions reductions are achievable
with today’s technology. Rapid permitting and construction (4-1-2) results in
emissions by 2032 being 25.09% of 2013 emissions, a reduction of 74.91%.

Table 2: Total U.S. GHG Emissions in Year 2032

Total U.S. GHG
Emissions Based on
Construction Strategy
Business As Usual
Waxman-Markey
4-1-2 yrs
4-2-2 yrs
4-2-3 yrs

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/8

Total Emission Levels in
Year 2032 Compared to 2013
120.82%
76.95%
46.49%
46.57%
46.66%
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4-3-4 yrs
4-2-5 yrs
8-1-2 yrs
8-2-2 yrs
8-2-3 yrs
8-2-5 yrs
8-3-4 yrs
12-1-2 yrs
12-2-2 yrs
12-2-3 yrs
12-3-4 yrs
12-2-5 yrs
12-4-6 yrs
16-1-2 yrs
16-2-2 yrs
16-2-3 yrs
16-3-4 yrs
16-2-5 yrs

[Vol. 30

47.04%
47.34%
52.0%
52.2%
52.4%
53.04%
53.2%
61.98%
62.53%
62.86%
64.05%
64.2%
68.1%
69.84%
70.54%
70.92%
72.29%
72.38%

Note: This table includes all emissions (Buildings, Utilities, Transportation, and
Land Use). Rapid permitting and construction (4-1-2) results in emissions by 2032
being 46.49% of 2013 emissions, a reduction of 53.51%.
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